This paper studies the interplay of capital resources in a small open economy by way of a general equilibrium political economy model. Normative implications for human capital migration resulting from physical capital lobbying are analyzed. Findings reveal that lobbying designed to mitigate the capital levy problem leads to increased human capital migration and that optimal tax policy for a social welfare maximizing government necessarily implies "brain drain". The implication being that skilled migration may be an inevitable by-product of a self-interested government. As such, while governments may vow to do something to stem the flow of their "best and brightest", the financial pull of increased revenues appears simply too great to imply anything other than lip service, when general equilibrium effects are considered. As a corollary, we find that restrictions on political contributions are welfare enhancing in the two-sided expropriations model we present.
Introduction
Much has been made about highly skilled or human capital migration, the so-called brain drain, in political circles. 1 Governments remain concerned that there will be (or will continue to be) shortages in key areas of the economy, such as health care, education and science (see, e.g., Gibson and McKenzie [2] ). Researchers have shown that skilled migration is a persistent and somewhat dominant pattern in our globalized economy, but need not present negative externalities in all situations (Docquier and Rapoport [3] ). The analysis here contributes, in part, to the externality arguments presented in previous research by adding an overlooked and under-analyzed synergistic behavior between capital resources in an open economy; namely, the interplay between physical and human capital that results from political economy decisions. We illustrate this relationship between the capital resources by way of a general equilibrium political economy model that permits lobbying by owners of physical capital and migration by workers, the owners of human capital, if you will. 2 It is in this latter sense that we also add to the literature on capital expropriation and it is where the main value-added of the paper originates.
The traditional capital levy problem relates to the underinvestment in physical capital that arises because of government incentives to expropriate surplus from sunk capital, since it imposes little deadweight loss (Eichengreen [6] ). Researchers have explored various iterations of the problem, such as reversibility of physical capital investments in the presence of lobbying (Marceau and Smart [7] ), persistence of inefficient policies in equilibrium as a result of sunk costs (Coate and Morris [8] ), and lobbying by owners of sunk capital (Garfinkel and Lee [9] ). Building on this and using the work of Bernheim and Whinston [10] as a starting point, our model takes into account the influence of human capital in the expropriations argument; thereby, it affects the two-sided argument we advocate and the one that has yet to be fully explored in the literature. 3 By modeling this interdependence amongst capital re- 2 Heckman and Klenow [4] and Heckman, Lochner and Taber [5] have examined human capital policy and general equilibrium cost-benefit effects of policy initiatives, but do not model the critical political economy ideas we are expressing here. That is, rather than simply examine the effects per se, we are examining the government's perception of and/or role in these effects. 3 While not expressed here, given the focus of the paper, the model also adds to the growing literature of computational models in political economy; those with no closed-form solution. For a discussion of such models and their value, see e.g., Kollman, Miller and Page [11] .
sources, we find that if the link is strong enough between human and physical capital and/or individuals are sufficiently mobile, then taxing one type of capital in favor of another may lead to (more) harmful disincentive effects and may even reduce the overall tax revenue of the government; the possibility that a change in the tax rate on physical or human capital may lead to spillover effects, which can have positive or negative repercussions on the residual capital, can also not be ruled out. 4 We show that in its effort to maximize the welfare of its constituents, a government will face inevitable human capital loss as a result. Optimal policy dictates that the government maximize welfare of non-migrants at the expense of this select cohort of highly skilled workers; as such, the loss of individuals at the upper end of the human capital ladder is simply an unfortunate byproduct of a self-interested government. 5 Therefore, while governments may vow to do something to stem the flow of their "best and brightest", the financial pull of increased revenues appears simply too great to imply anything other than lip service, when general equilibrium effects are considered. The reason for the outcome is that a marginal increase in labor taxation, culminating in some skilled migration, is less detrimental than a marginal drop in public goods, which would manifest if no tax increase were enacted. Given this, we find that it is indeed advantageous to have a restriction on capital lobbying for countries that bleed top talent (i.e. experience negative political economy externalities) and it can go a long way in mitigating the implications that this two-sided capital levy problem has on skilled migration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model, while Section 3 presents the implications of lobbying and human capital migration; Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
Model

Preferences and Payoffs
Consider a small open economy in which one public good-labeled good 0-and N private consumption goods-labeled -are produced. We shall assume that the public good is non-traded, while the N private goods are freely traded. The world price of good i,
is denoted by i p . The industry that produces good i is called industry i. Each private good is produced by a single industry, using labor and capital. As for the public good, it is produced by the government, also with inputs of labor and capital.
There exists a continuum of consumers in this economy and, to simplify, we shall normalize the population size to 1. The population is divided into two major groups: capitalists and workers. Workers earn their living by supplying part of their time endowment -normalized to 1 -on the labor market. Capitalists do not work. They are the owners of capital stocks in the private sector, which constitute the sources of their income. Let 0
denote the fraction of the population who are the owners of the capital stock in industry i. We suppose that the group that consists of the owners of the capital stock in industry i and the group that consists of the owners of the capital stock in industry j, , are disjoint. As a group, the capitalists thus make up a fraction of the population equal to 1 2
while the proportion of the population who are workers is given by
. We shall assume that for each i the owners of the capital stock in industry i are equal residual claimants of the profits made by the industry. Workers, however, are assumed to differ in their earning capacity -specifically, by their human capital level. The human capital level of a worker is denoted by  . To avoid corner solutions the distribution of types among workers is represented by a continuous density function
To model the difference in earnings due to variation in human capital levels, we shall assume that labor inputs are measured in effective labor units and that for each hour that a worker of type  spends in the production of a good, she provides  units of effective labor input. If we let  denote the wage rate paid to one unit of effective labor input, then the labor income earned by a worker of type  , when she works one hour, is  . A worker's preferences is represented by the utility function,
where 0 u x is consumption of the public good; , 1
is consumption of the i th private good; and is labor supply in hours. We impose the following conditions on preferences: (i) 4 Pecorino [12] examines the interesting question of the effect of tax structure on long run growth of income and consumption. To do so, he relies on changing the tax mix between human and physical capital, which must satisfy an exogenously determined government budget constraint. Similar in its treatment to Marceau and Smart [7] , the question being addressed is not a political economy one, and as such differs from the work undertaken here. 5 This finding goes against that of Razin, Sadka and Swagel [13] that suggests migration does not necessarily tilt the political balance in favor of those with the power to create this hold-up problem. In other words, the fiscal leakage they talk about does not seem to be present, when general equilibrium considerations are taken into account; at least not to the same extent they talk about. x  0; a n d
The subutility function u is linear homogeneous and increasing in all its arguments.
As for a capitalist, who does not work and thus does not suffer from the disutility of working, her utility de- 
To finance the production of the public good, the government levies a capital income tax and a labor income tax. Let i  be the tax rate on profits made by firms in industry i and t the tax rate on wages. There is no double taxation of physical olicy is therefore represented by a list .
We want to explore the impact that taxation has on workers' incentives to migrate, therefore we allow them to be perfectly mobile within the boundaries of the small open economy-at no cost. They could also choose to leave the home country and work in the outside world if they are willing to pay some cost of adjustment. The cost of adjustment of a worker of type  denoted by  , a  is continuously differentiable, strictly positive, and strictly decreasing in  .
Let  denote the wage rate earned by one unit of effective labor abroad. For a worker of type  , leaving the home country to work in a foreign country will yield a net labor income-net of adjustment costs-equal to 
In Equation (1),
F K L is the technology used in the production of good i; K i is the capital stock in this industry; and L i is the labor inputs -measured in effecttive labor units. It is assumed that
F K L is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing in each of its arguments. Furthermore, there are diminishing returns in each factor and the following Inada conditions are satisfied
As defined,
represents the before-tax profits made by industry i, given that it faces the effective labor wage rate .
 Note that the capital income tax does not influence the production plan of the industry. We shall denote by   i L  the demand for effective labor by industry i.
As a group, the owners of the capital stock in industry i receive an income equal to    
, which gives each capitalist in this group a capital income of
Thus, a member of the group that owns capital stock in industry i solves the following utility maximization problem:
Note that in solving, the capitalist takes as given 0 x , the level of the public good provided by the government. Also, in Equation (2), we have let denote the indirect utility function associated with the consumption of the N private goods, as a function of the after-tax capital income. Since the subutility function associated with the consumption of the private goods is linear homogenous, without any loss of generality we can set
which allows us to assert that the utility of a capitalist is the same as her net income.
Consider a worker of type  , who chooses not to emigrate. Her disposable income is then   1 t    , which will be spent on private goods. The utility obtained from the consumption of the private goods is
and the disutility from working is . Thus she solves the following utility maximization problem:
where we have let   , , t    denote the indirect utility function associated with the consumption of the N private goods and the disutility of working for a worker of type  , who chooses not to emigrate. Using (ii) of the preference assertions made earlier, we can assert that Equation (3) has a unique interior solution, which is characterized by the first-order condition
The optimal labor supply of a worker of type  who chooses not to leave the country is then given by
where we have let  
Because the marginal disutility of working is strictly increasing in , it is clear that the optimal labor supply of a worker of type   who does not emigrate is strictly
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A worker who chooses to leave the country will solve the following utility maximization problem:
Note that in the objective function (Equation 4) there is no public good. In essence, we are restricting the individual to a migration decision based on income and adjustment costs. 6 By doing this we are essentially saying that public goods are not an overriding factor for migration, particularly when the latter has an uncertain, but positive, cost attached. Now consider a worker with human capital level  . If she emigrates and decides to work hours, then after paying for the adjustment cost, she is left with a net income of
. On the other hand, if she decides to stay, then her disposable income is  
, which in turn implies that it is not optimal for her to leave the country. Hence only a worker with a human capital level
, could entertain the idea of leaving the country. Thus if
, then no worker, regardless of her human capital level, will choose to leave the country. The phenomenon of brain drain could only occur if
, if the net wage rate in the home country is below that abroad. If migration costs are positive then the wage abroad must reflect this, otherwise no emigration will occur. Furthermore, when the utility of the public good is taken into consideration, only a worker with a sufficiently high level of human capital would think of leaving the country.
To see why, note that   a   is strictly decreasing in 0   and tends to infinity when  tends to 0.
Hence when
, there exists a unique value of
It follows directly from the definition of
When the impact of the public good is taken into consideration, the loss in utility suffered by a worker of type
, if she decides to leave the country will be
which is even more pronounced. To continue, let
Through the use of the envelope theorem and the optimal labor supplies (and some manipulation), we get,
This last result together with the inequality 
In order for the labor input to be sufficient for producing the amount of public good 0
x , the following condition must also be satisfied:
In Equation (6),
is the production function used in the production of the public good, where , ,
In Equation (7), we have let
 
H  denote the cumulative distribution of  . Also note that on the right-hand side of Equation (7) the first part gives the utility from the consumption of the public good, while
represents the utility from the consumption of the private goods and the disutility of working, for all workers who stay.
As for the owners of the capital stock in industry j, 1, , , j N   each of them has a capital income equal to
which according to our earlier calculations is also the capitalist's utility from the consum goods. Her utility under the tax policy is thus given by, ption of private
Therefore, as a group, the owners of the capital stock in industry j obtain the following utility under the tax
In Equation (8) 
be a solution of Equation (9) . The equilibrium wage rate and the level of public goods pro- In what follows, the ordered pair  ,t  represents the tax policy under which capital is uniformly taxed at rate  across industries and wages are taxed at rate t. When the tax policy   ,t  is implemented, the social welfare obtained will be written under the following form:
Under this scenario, the home government solves the following social welfare maximization problem:
While a tax on profits is neutral, a tax on wages distorts the labor-leisure choice of workers and might induce emigration. Therefore, we expect that the home government will favor taxing capital, the immobile, sunk factor, over taxing labor in it efforts to raise the revenues needed in the provision of the public goods. This is simply the traditional capital levy problem, but in general equilibrium context. Proposition 1 confirms this intuittion. 
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lobbying and Human Capital Migration
When the industry lobbies are active, the global payoff of the home government and the N industry lobbies is given by
The tax policy implemented by the home government is a solution of the following maximization problem:
, . Furthermore, because the equilibrium wage rates are the same under both tax policies, the (before-tax) profits earned by each industry are also the same, as are the total capital tax revenues collected. Hence, the welfare of the owners of capital, as a group, does not ch hom t switches from . Therefore, the home government can restrict itself to the case
, the case where capital is taxed at the same rate across industries. A tax policy can now be represented by an ordered pair, say   ,t  , where  is the uniform tax rate on capital and t is the tax rate on wages. The gross equilibrium wage rate and the equilibrium level of public goods provided will be denoted, respectively, by   In other words, if the home government chooses not to tax wages, then the tax rate it imposes on capital is lower when the N industry lobbies are active than when they are inactive: lobbying activities, under this scenario, reduce the capital income tax rate and a fortiori the level of public goods provided.
Here we have simply shown what others have done before us, but in a general equilibrium sense; namely, that the introduction of lobbying can help mitigate the capital levy problem. We have provided additional insight into the argument by explicitly modeling public good provision. Since the government does not use lobbying money towards the production of the public goods, workers see a reduction in their welfare. 
As for the owners of capital in the home country, as a group, their total welfare is given by
Differentiating Equation (16) with respect to t, then evaluating the result at 0 t  , we obtain   . Therefore, Equation (18) will be positive when  is not too high. However, it might be negative if  is substantial.
Differentiating Equation (17) with respect to t, then evaluating the result at 0 t  , we obtain,
Observe that for each , the expression 1, ,
represents the rate of change in the welfare of the owners of capital in industry j due to a higher level of public goods provided, while the expression
represents the loss of capital incomes suffered by this group due to a higher wage bill that the industry pays to its workers. As in the case of workers, the first expression dominates the second expression when  is small. However, when  is substantial, the summation in Equation (19) might be negative. Under such a scenario, raising the tax rate on wages above zero might make the owners of capital in the home economy worse off as a group. Because the impact on the owners of capital of a rise in the wage rate operates indirectly through the rise in the gross equilibrium wage rate and the rise in the level of public goods provided, while the impact on workers operates both directly -through the reductions in labor income -and indirectly -through the rise in the level of public goods provided and the rise in the gross equilibrium wage rate -the impacts, when they are negative, are more adverse to the workers. In particular, it is difficult to imagine that a slight increase in the wage rate above zero will improve the situation of the workers, but make the situation of the owners of capital worse off. Therefore, for any 0 1    , if the home government has already taxed capital at rate  and can raise the welfare of the workers by also taxing wages slightly, then this action also raises the welfare of the owners of capital, which leads to the following, Proposition 3. The tax rate on wages will be positive, , if industry lobbies are active. 0 t  Proof. See Appendix C. Thus, once again in the presence of lobbying firms can alleviate some of their tax burden by providing financial support for a political party's platform. The resulting loss in tax revenues used to fund the provision of the public goods must either be recouped by increasing the taxation on labor income or by reducing the level of public goods. But, any reduction in public goods will lower the welfare of the government's constituents by a larger amount, than a small increase in income taxes. Therefore, taxes on labor income rise in the presence of lobbying and the government concedes the resulting migration by some highly skilled labor in an effort to make the remaining constituents better off, thereby ensuring its persistence in office.
While no dependence of unskilled on skilled labor is built into the model, it is not hard to imagine that if skilled labor leads to job creation for unskilled workers, the reduction at the upper end of the human capital scale will intensify the negative spillover effects. This type of argument would exacerbate the implications of our findings for countries that bleed talent, in particular, or, at least, have an inequitable impact on skill differential between those that leave versus enter from abroad. As such, a restriction on capital lobbying would likely imply a more efficient solution.
Concluding Remarks
By modeling the two-sided expropriations problem, we have shown how changes in tax policy can influence migration patterns of skilled workers. By doing so, we have explored some indirect implications of the traditional problem which has yet to be examined. For example, whether or not a country is human capital intensive will depend directly on the taxation of skilled labor and its mobility and indirectly on policies guiding political contributions and capital income taxes. The more lax the policies are on the indirect effects, the greater the direct incentives for migration of highly skilled individuals will be.
Modeling the expropriation decision in a general equilibrium framework also affords a commentary on the externality caused by physical capital lobbying on human capital migration. For example, all else being equal, if adjustment costs rise in the home country, then a greater number of highly skilled workers remain and the economy is now more human capital intensive; this, according to endogenous growth theory, leads to an improved economic outlook. Of course, this goes for countries that bleed talent. For countries that rely on attracting skilled labor from abroad, the results are the opposite. If migration costs rise, then fewer workers are choosing to emigrate. Therefore, countries that relied on skilled labor to supplement their workforce may fall short of their necessary requirements.
Finally, we show that while equilibrium under social welfare maximization calls for a high capital income tax. This result falls apart with the allowance of lobbying. Fortunately, the mobility of skilled labor provides a deterrent to the government when determining the structure of taxation. Hence, labor income taxation remains low even in the face of lobbying. This result casts doubt on previous findings that believe restrictions on lobbying have ambiguous results (e.g. Marceau and Smart [7] ). Certainly, in our framework such restrictions appear to be positive in terms of providing increased welfare for government constituents. To be fair, unlike Marceau and Smart [7] , we include a labor-migration choice for a worker, which acts as a constraint. 
If inequality holds in Equation (10a), then the argument just presented for the case can be repeated verbatim obtain the same conclusion: capital should be taxed at rate , but wages should not be taxed. 
Indeed, if this is not the case, then we must have
